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The politics of citizenship today is first and foremost a politics of nation-
hood. As such, it is a politics of identity, not a politics of interest (in the 
restricted, materialist sense). It pivots more on self-understanding than on 
self-interest. The "interests" informing the politics of citizenship are "ideal" 
rather than material. The central question is not "who gets what?" but rather 
"who is what?" 
(Brubaker1992: 182) 
Modern allegiances and senses of loyalty are determined by nation-states. 
The modern notion of citizenship involves membership of the nation-state. 
In the course of the past few years, there has been an increase in academic 
efforts in the West to critically examine and perhaps redefine the notion of 
modern citizenship. Today, the notion of modern citizenship is in the 
process of being divorced from its inherent attachment to the nation-state. 
In other words, we live in an era in which increasing demands are being 
expressed in order to widen the public realm to accomodate differences that 
were previously relegated to the private realm. These demands for opening 
up the public realm to differences involve women, immigrants and blacks, as 
well as ethnic and religious groups. Since the modern notion of citizenship 
that involves membership of a nation-state is inadequate in representing the 
demands of such groups, it has become an obstacle to the democratization 
efforts of modern nation-states. 
At the close of the twentieth century, political theorists who have focused 
on the question of democratization began to discuss social and political alle-
giances and senses of belonging. Such debates went hand-in-hand with 
social movements that either advocated cgoism/atomist individualism or 
altruism. Hence, there emerged individualist anarchism on the one hand and 
communitarian tendencies on the other The common denominator of these 
trends is that they both question and put under scrutiny modern notions of 
identity, albeit from different angles, i.e. while one glorifies the atomized 
individual, the other glorifies the community. What seems certain is that 
modern notions of identity and belonging that mainly revolve around alle-
giances   to   the   nation-state   are   declining.   With   the   increasing   public 
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expression of identities other than the national one, many of the categories 
of modern politics have proved themselves inadequate. 
1 have earlier argued that the limitations of the feminist arguments in 
Turkey basically stem from an assumption of women as citizens prior to 
being individuals (Kadioglu 1996a; 1998a; 1993a). Feminist demands in 
Turkey arc usually posed by way of attachment to grand social and polit-
ical projects such as Kemalism or Socialism, as well as Islamic identities. 
Kemalist feminists emphasize women's public visibility in modern attire, 
especially in the political arena, such as their presence and visibility in the 
parliament and within political party structures. Socialist women, in the 
course of the 1970s, emphasized a view of equality of women which came 
to mean "similarity with men." Hence, they denounced their sexuality and 
femininity and posed as "sisters" of socialist men (Berktay 1990). Islamic 
women, on the other hand, have been staging a fight of the costumes 
since the early 1980s. With the advent of political Islam, the covered 
bodies of the Moslem women are perpetuated in stark contrast with 
the bodies of modern women. These women resort to veiling in order to 
emphasize their personality rather than their sexuality (Gole 1991: 125; 
Kadıoglu 1994). Veiling, then, has become a way of denouncing sexuality 
outside of the confines of a marital arrangement. Thus Turkish women, 
in the course of serving such grand social and political projects, 
denounced their individual identities. The trajectory of Turkish men is 
not too different from that of Turkish women in terms of the denounce-
ment of individuality. Hence, Turkish men and women first and foremost 
perceive themselves as Turkish , citizens who are responsible for 
performing certain duties. 
In this chapter, the Turkish notion of citizenship will be examined by 
referring to existing categorizations in the literature on citizenship. 
Accordingly, first of all, the structural and historical factors that shape the 
notion of citizenship will be portrayed by focusing on the respective 
sequence of the state-formation and nation-building processes in Turkey. 
Second, the Turkish notion of citizenship will be examined from the angle 
of the liberal versus civic-republican traditions in political philosophy. 
Third, whether the Turkish notion of citizenship can be characterized as 
active or passive will be discussed, while at the same time assessing the 
extent of interference into the private realm of Turkish citizens. The evalu-
ation of the Turkish conception of citizenship along these lines will 
involve references to statements of some of the founding elite of the 
Republic as well as certain institutional arrangements that were under-
taken especially in the early years of the Republic. The main thesis of this 
chapter is that "the citizen precedes the individual" in Turkey (Kadioglu 
1999). A critical evaluation of the literature on citizenship will pave the 
way to the inadequacy of a view of citizenship as membership (either of a 
nation or a state). Hence, at the end of this chapter, a view of citizenship as 
a position will be suggested. 
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The citizenship problematique 
The roots of the modern concept of citizenship can be located in the French 
Revolution and its immediate aftermath. Citizenship is a modern concept. It 
evolved along with the evolution of various nationalisms in Europe in the 
aftermath of the French Revolution. In fact, the beginning of immigration 
control in Europe was an outcome of the French Revolution. In England, 
for instance, the 1792 Aliens Bill was a direct response to the flight of 
French refugees (about 8,000) from the French Revolution (Plender 1972: 
43). In America and Switzerland too, immigration control began as a reac-
tion to the French Revolution and fears that Jacobin emissaries had 
infiltrated immigrant groups. 
The modern concept of "citizen" is closely associated with the notion of 
civilization which entails a movement from rural to urban centers. A citizen 
is someone from the cite (city). In the course of the eighteenth century, the 
cite was a place where individual freedoms were pushed to the forefront and 
feudal hierarchical structures were destroyed. Accordingly, the citoyen 
(citizen) was the motor of these changes away from feudal bondage relations 
toward capitalist contractual relations. The nineteenth century, on the 
contrary, was characterized by many Romantic views of the cite as the 
center of decadence and deterioration. The most important reaction to the 
French Revolution and Napoleon's conquests in the German states was felt 
not in the political, legal and institutional realms but in literature. 
Accordingly, nineteenth-century German Romanticism was characterized by 
a yearning for the provinces and rural life away from the cite. 
Today, with the increasing scrutiny of the basic categories of modernity, 
the modern notion of citizenship has begun to be viewed outside of its 
inherent attachment to the nation-state. The need to revise the modern cate-
gory of citizenship is an implication of the process of globalization. 
Globalization and the transfer of images and populations across countries 
has prompted the opening up of the public realm to differences that were 
earlier relegated to the private realm. Such differences are usually expressed 
in terms of languages pertaining to gender, race, religion, and ethnicity. 
In the Turkish context, the urge to revise and redefine the notion of citi-
zenship has stemmed from a visible accentuation of the expression of 
women's as well as Islamic and Kurdish identities during the political climate 
of the late 1980s and 1990s. The presence of such differences that were 
earlier part of the private realm began to make their debut in the public 
realm. The absolute, homogeneous, all-encompassing category of Turkish 
citizenship was demystified and began to crumble due to the predominance 
of an "identity politics" in Turkey based on gender-related, religious and 
ethnic identities. 
While the issue garnered increasing attention in academic circles,1 a new 
notion called "constitutional citizenship" began to be discussed in political 
circles and the expression was even used by the then president, Süleyman 
Demirel (Vergin  1996;  Ustel,   1996a). Tn the midst of these debates on 
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Turkish citizenship, some people began to refer to themselves as "I am from 
Turkey" (Türkiye'liyim) rather than "I am a Turk" (Turküm). This event 
symbolized the demystification of the official view of Turkish citizenship 
declared in Mustafa Kemal Atatiirk's famous expression "How happy is the 
one who calls himself a Turk!" (Ne mutlu Türküm diyene!). I believe the issue 
of citizenship poses the question of democratization in Turkey from the 
angle of modernity rather than focusing on the specific features and prob-
lems of the Turkish modernization project. Scrutiny of the modern notion 
of citizenship has not been peculiar to Turkey. It is a process that has been 
unleashed all over the world as a result of the dynamics of globalization. 
Almost all the new analyses of the modern notion of citizenship in the 
literature refer to T. H. Marshall's classic works (Marshall 1950; 1977). 
Marshall refers to three dimensions of citizenship: civil and legal, political, 
and social. First of all, the civil and legal rights of citizens evolved in the 
course of the seventeenth century vis-a-vis the absolutist states. Accordingly, 
courts and individual legal rights began to appear. Second, political rights 
evolved in the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries alongside 
the evolution of modern parliamentary systems. Third, the social dimension 
of citizenship is a phenomenon of the twentieth century and is related to the 
welfare state. This dimension paved the way to certain social rights of indi-
viduals such as employment, health, and education. Marshall then pointed 
to a uniform, evolutionary and tclcological history of the notion of citizen-
ship. As a result, his citizenship theory was criticized extensively in the 
recent literature for failing to account for various types of modern citizen-
ship (Turner 1992; 1993; van Steenbcrgen 1994). 
Still, the sequence in the emergence of the three dimensions of citizenship 
can be utilized in accounting for different trajectories toward modern citi-
zenship. In cases where democratization preceded bureaucratization, civil 
and legal rights acquire predominance to the detriment of social rights. Tn 
the United States, for instance, the notion of "social citizenship" is an 
oxymoron (Fraser and Gordon 1994), Citizens relate to the state either via 
contractual arrangements or they receive aid from the state in the form of 
charity. Hence, the recipients of welfare state benefits are usually viewed as 
lazy parasites who are unworthy of the honor of citizenship. Quite 
contrarily, in Germany, where bureaucratization preceded democratization, 
citizens (members of the Volk) benefit from welfare state provisions as 
"rights." In Turkey, the distinguishing feature of civil and legal, political and 
social rights is the fact that they were given from above rather than acquired 
as rights in the aftermath of demands and struggles from below. Hence, citi-
zenship was bestowed from above prior to the birth of a bourgeoisie that 
posed demands and ignited the fire that culminated in constitutionalism.2 
Anatomy of Turkish citizenship3 
In what follows, the evolution of Turkish citizenship in the early republican 
era will be portrayed by situating it within the existing literature on citizen- 
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ship. Accordingly, first of all, the evolution of the concept will be connected 
to the evolution of nationalism in Turkey. Second, the impact of the civic-
republican tradition in shaping the contours of Turkish citizenship will be 
addressed. Third, the evolution of Turkish citizenship from above will be 
portrayed while pointing to the invaded nature of the private realm of 
Turkish citizens. 
A state seeking its nation: the evolution of Turkish nationalism and 
citizenship 
The years between 1789 and 1815 signaled the emergence of both French 
and German nationalisms (Kohn 1967). German nationalism emerged 
alongside a literary tradition called Romanticism. One of the most distin-
guishing features of this tradition was its critical attitude toward French 
cosmopolitanism. German Romantics thought that the rationalism of the 
eighteenth century was artificial. They relied on intuitions and emotions 
rather than reason and intellect. The German Romantic tradition reveals the 
dark and anti-rational aspects of German nationalism. The notion of a 
German nation that evolved in the course of the nineteenth century 
stemmed from a Völkisch ideology which later formed the basis of the 
National Socialist worldview. German Romantic literature became the 
medium for the expression of German nationalism in the course of the nine-
teenth century, prior to the formation of a German nation-state. Since 
German nationalism preceded the nation-state, it was expressed in ethnic 
and cultural terms. Accordingly, Rogers Brubaker refers to an "ethnocul-
tural conception of nationhood" in Germany (Brubaker 1989; 1990; 1992). 
In comparing the German and French conceptions of nationhood and citi-
zenship, Brubaker says: 
It is one thing to want to make all citizens of Utopia speak Utopian, 
and quite another to want to make all Utopiphones citizens of Utopia. 
Crudely put, the former represents the French, the latter the German 
model of nationhood. Whether juridical (as in naturalization) or 
cultural, assimilation presupposes a political conception of membership 
and the belief, which France took over from the Roman tradition, that 
the state can turn strangers into citizens, peasants or immigrant 
workers — into Frenchmen. 
(Brubaker 1992; 8) 
Hence, while the French conception of citizenship evolved in an assimila-
tionist and state-centered manner, the German conception acquired an 
organic, differentialist, dissimilationist and Volk-centered character. French 
nationhood evolved in a predominantly political way while German nation-
hood became predominantly ethnocultural. As Brubaker puts it: 
110    Turkish citizenship as non-membership? 
In fact, traditions of nationhood have political and cultural components 
in both countries. These components have been closely integrated in 
France, where political unity has been understood as constitutive, 
cultural unity as expressive of nationhood. In the German tradition, in 
contrast, political and ethnocultural aspects of nationhood have stood 
in tension with one another, serving as the basis for competing concep-
tions of nationhood. One such conception is sharply opposed to the 
French conception: according to this view, ethnocultural unity is consti-
tutive, political unity expressive, of nationhood. 
(Brubaker 1992: 10) 
Hence, the temporal distance between the state-formation and nation-
building processes, as well as their sequence, gave shape to the conceptions 
of nationhood and citizenship in France and Germany (Kadioglu 1991; 
1992; 1993b; 1993c; 1996c). Since French nationalism appeared at about the 
same time as the French nation-state, political and social unity was the work 
of statesmen. German nationalism preceded by half a century the formation 
of the German nation-state. The German Romantic tradition was laden 
with motifs of yearning for a national state. Such a temporal distance made 
ethnic and cultural unity constitutive of German nationalism. This paved 
the way to the significance laid on blood ties and/or descent as the basis of 
modern German citizenship. 
The distinction between French and German nationalisms and conceptu-
alizations of citizenship are significant in understanding Turkish 
nationalism at two points: First of, all, Turkish nationalism displays the 
characteristics of both French and German nationalisms. It embraces both 
Civilization and Culture; hence it has a paradoxical nature (Kadioglu 
1996d). The paradox between Civilization and Culture is nowhere better 
expressed than in the writings of Ziya Gökalp. The type of nationalism that 
Ziya Gokalp mentioned in his writings was individualist and cosmopolitan, 
yet it also espoused the retainment of a local, pristine identity. Hence, the 
concepts of Civilization and Culture were not antithetical, mutually exclu-
sive entities in Ziya Gokalp's thought. Rather he tried to synthesize them. 
Niyazi Berkes, in his analysis of Ziya Gokalp's thought, maintains that: 
If his analyses are taken as a whole, however, these two concepts 
(Culture and Civilization) do not represent antithetical and mutually 
exclusive entities, but rather two closely related and complementary 
traits of social reality. ... Civilizational elements assume meaning and 
function in the life of men only when they enter into the service of 
culture. Without a cultural basis, civilization becomes merely a matter of 
mechanical imitation; it never penetrates into the inner life of a people 
and never gives fruit of any kind. 
(Berkes 1959: 23) 
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It is possible to argue that if nationalism is a modern Janus, the Turkish 
version had two faces as well. While in most instances Turkish nationalism 
looked similar to the civic French nationalism, there were certain periods in 
the founding years of the Republic when the organic, ethnic face that is akin 
to German nationalism became more pronounced. In a study that attempts 
a periodization of Turkish nationalism, and accordingly the formation of 
citizenship practices, Ahmet Yıldız (2001) brings out into the open the 
pronounced ethno-cultural dimension of Turkish citizenship, especially in 
the period between 1929 and 1938. His book is aptly titled Ne mutlu Türküm 
Diyebilene (How happy is the one who can call himself a Turk) in pointing 
to a subtle distinction between "calling oneself a Turk" and "can call oneself 
a Turk." The latter expression, i.e. the ability to call oneself a Turk, makes 
references to ethnic, ascriptive qualifications and it was an expression used 
by one of the ideologues of the Turkish revolution, Bozkurt Mahmut Esat 
in 1934 (Yildiz 2001: 212). In unraveling the mostly neglected "evil" face of 
Turkish nationalism, Yildiz refers to legal, political arrangements, the 
records of parliamentary proceedings and the proceedings of the 
Republican People's Party, as well as memoirs and texts of the leading ideo-
logues of the early republican years. According to Yildiz's periodization of 
the early republican years, the fundamental references of Turkish nation-
alism evolved from religious (1919-23) to secular (1924-29) themes and then 
became suffused by ethnocultural (1929-38) motifs. The citizenship prac-
tices evolved in accordance with these core elements in their respective 
periods.4 
Second, it is important to point to the sequence.of the emergence of state 
and nation in Turkey. Whereas in the German case, it is possible to refer to a 
nation preceding a state, i.e. "a nation in search of its state," in the Turkish ' 
scenario the historical order of things is reversed. In the case of modern 
republican Turkey, one can refer to a state preceding a nation, i.e. "a state in 
search of its nation" (Kadioglu 1995). The Turkish nation was constructed 
by means of certain measures that were undertaken by the republican elite. In 
the words of Şerif Mardin (1981: 196): "Mustafa Kemal took upon a 
hypothetical entity, the Turkish nation, and breathed life in it." In this 
construction, political unity appears as the constitutive unit of the Turkish 
nation-state. In short, the indivisibility of the Turkish state with its nation, 
and the irreversibility of the holy borders - contrary to the case in Germany - 
constitute the cornerstone of Turkish national identity. 
Hence, Turkish citizenship appears as a notion defined from above by the 
leading figures in the People's Republican Party at the time of the founding 
years of the Republic that was based on a one-party regime. The distin-
guishing features of this notion of citizenship were delineated in the 1931 
Congress of the Republican People's Party and were formulated as the "six 
arrows" that became the insignia of the party. These were: nationalism, secu-
larism, populism, republicanism, etatism, and revolutionism. These 
founding principles constitute the core of the Turkish Republic. 
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On 19 February 1932, the People's Houses {Halkevleri) were founded in 
fourteen cities in order to promote these core principles of the Republic. 
They aimed at creating the ideal republican citizen who had embraced these 
core principles that were represented in the insignia of the People's 
Republican Party. It was through the activities of the People's Houses that 
the republican elite aimed at breathing life into the citizens of the Turkish 
nation (Soyarik 2000). The main aim of the journal of the People's Houses 
(Ülkü) was to provide the six arrows with a theoretical framework as well as 
teaching them to the people. The function of the People's Houses was 
further supported by the formation of two other institutions, namely the 
Turkish History Society (Turk Tarih Kurumu) and Turkish Linguistic 
Society (Turk Dil Kurumu) in 1931 and 1932 respectively. The Turkish 
History Society researched the history of Turks in the pre-Islamic period 
and aimed at spreading the view that all the civilizations of the world 
stemmed from the Turkish civilization that was rooted in Central Asia. The 
Turkish Linguistic Society, on the other hand, tried to bring out the beauty 
and richness of the Turkish language as the mother of all languages. 
The People's Houses, as well as the Turkish History Society and Turkish 
Linguistic Society, aimed at creating a Turkish citizen prior to the emergence 
of an individualist ethic in Turkey. Hence, they were instrumental in forming 
a notion of citizenship that emphasized obligations instead of rights. 
Militant Turkish citizen burdened with duties 
Another classification of the modern notion of citizenship in the literature 
stems from a philosophical distinction between the liberal or liberal-individualist 
traditions and the classical or civic-republican tradition. Adrian Oldfield 
(1990; 1994), who classifies modern citizenship on the basis of these philo-
sophical traditions, refers to the differences between citizenship as "status" 
and citizenship as "practice." Liberal-individualism has been the dominant 
strain of thought in Anglo-American political thinking since the seventeenth 
century, roughly from Hobbcs onward. According to Oldfield (1990: 1), 
liberal individualism accords the individual an ontological, epistemological 
and a moral priority. Liberal individualism defines citizenship as a status on 
the basis of "rights," and hence gives rise to a language of citizenship in 
terms of needs and entitlements. "The status of citizenship" imposes no 
"duties" on the individuals beyond the minimally civic ones. Individuals 
relate to each other on a contractual basis. Any other form of public involve-
ment and political activity is their "choice." Hence, in the liberal-individualist 
tradition, the conception of citizenship generates no social bond other than 
contract. It does not prompt any type of social solidarity, cohesion, and any 
sense of common purpose (Oldfield 1994: 190). It produces an individual 
who is deficient and impoverished as a social being. 
The classical or the civic-republican tradition has its origins in the ethical 
and political thought of Aristotle.  It was  reinforced and modified by a 
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succession of political thinkers from Macchiavelli to Rousseau and beyond. 
In the words of Oldfield (1990: 5), "it addresses much more cogently the 
twin themes of citizenship and community." In the classical tradition, citi-
zenship appears as an activity or a practice so that not to engage in the 
practice is, in important senses, not to be a citizen (Oldfield 1994: 192). 
Citizenship, in this tradition, is expressed in terms of a language of "duties," 
and/or obligations to the community. Practices empower individuals to act 
like citizens. It is the shared commitment to these practices which makes 
individuals citizens. It is action in such spheres as military service which is 
both constitutive of citizenship and sustaining of the community of which 
the citizen is a member. In this view, individuals are not thought of as logi-
cally prior to society (Oldfield 1994: 191). Moreover, they have no moral 
priority. As a result, claims may be made on their time, resources, and lives 
for the morally superior entity which is the community. Oldfleld's (1994: 
193) major endeavor is to instigate an articulation between these two tradi-
tions and redefine the notion of modern citizenship by benefiting from the 
good aspects of each: 
In the Western world, the ideal of citizenship as status is one which it is 
not difficult to think of as achievable, even if vigilance is required to 
ensure that the achievement is sustained. Our confidence here is in large 
part a product of the sheer amount of thought and struggle which have 
been invested in the ideal. The same cannot be said of the ideal of citi-
zenship as practice, and in large part this reflects the very success of the 
liberal-individualist achievement, which was to liberate the individual 
from the constricting influences of society and the state. The thinking 
has been there, but the struggle has not. The question, therefore, is 
whether the struggle is worthwhile. [We must not expect to displace the 
idea of citizenship as status, but we can use elements of this conception to 
further the project of citizenship as practice.] 
(Oldfield's 1994: 193) 
The Turkish notion of citizenship in the aftermath of the proclamation of 
the Republic evolved in a manner that is more akin to the civic-republican 
tradition. Accordingly, Turkish citizenship is based more on "duties" than 
on "rights." Citizenship education started in the education system of the 
Turkish Republic in 1924 with the course on Information About the 
Motherland (Malumat-ı Vataniye) for the primary and secondary school 
curriculum. This was replaced in 1927 with another course called Yurt 
Bilgisi and later on Yurttaşlık Bilgisi. After 1985 a new course on 
Information on Citizenship (Vatandaşlık Bilgileri) appeared, and in the 
1990s a course on Citizenship and Human Rights (Vatandaşlık ve İnsan 
Hakları) was introduced. In a study surveying the books utilized in citizen-
ship education courses in primary and secondary schools in Turkey in the 
republican era, Füsun Üstel (2002) underlines the evolution of a notion of 
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citizenship based on duties. Accordingly, the most outstanding aim of citi-
zenship education appears as the achievement of civilization and the 
inculcation of patriotism. Ustel refers to a "militant" citizen who evolved 
until the end of the 1940s and who was "burdened with duties." The obliga-
tions of the militant citizen were strengthened by referring to a perceived 
threat to the Republic. The "Other" that is portrayed as a threat or an 
enemy was a leitmotif in citizenship education. What is implied by the Other 
is sometimes the sultanate and the ancien regime. In units that describe the 
War of Independence, the Other becomes the Greeks. The duties of citizen-
ship were also outlined in a book that was prepared by Mustafa Kemal's 
adopted daughter Afet İnan (1969). Mustafa Kemal contributed to the 
preparation of the book that was called Civic Information for the Citizen 
(Vatandaş için Medeni Bilgiler). This book was first published in 1930. The 
book mainly describes the duties of citizens toward the family, society, and 
the state. Accordingly, citizens were required to pay taxes and obey rules 
pertaining to public order, as well as participate in elections. Men were 
expected to serve in the military, which was regarded as an enlightening 
institution. 
Fuat Keyman (1997) presents a notion of republican citizenship that is 
constituted by means of duties in order to promote a "common good" to the 
detriment of individual rights. He interprets the concept of citizenship in 
Turkey within the framework of the Platonic nature of the Kemalist project 
of modernity. Accordingly, "common good" is defined by reference to a 
"will to civilization" on the part of the state elites. Hence, politics in this 
context does not entail an articulation of different demands into the decision-
making process, and therefore their representation, but rather the steering of 
society toward a common good defined by the state elite in accordance with 
their will to civilization. This common good has ontological priority over 
demands coming from society. As a result, the citizen appears both as the 
object of the Kemalist modernization project and its carrier. She or he is not 
only expected to internalize this project but also reproduces the sovereign 
position of the state. 
Passive Turkish citizenship with an invaded private realm 
Bryan Turner (1992; 1993) puts forward a classification of the modern 
notion of citizenship based on the two axes of active versus passive and the 
extent of its definition within the public realm. Accordingly, there exist four 
types of modern citizenship that evolved in four different contexts: first of 
all, in revolutionary contexts, citizenship involves a struggle from below 
(active citizenship) with an emphasis on the public arena (citizenship 
evolved in the public realm). As a result, the private world of the individual 
is regarded with suspicion. Second, in the liberal pluralist context, citizen-
ship, once again involves a struggle for rights from below (active citizenship), 
yet there also exists a continuous emphasis on the rights of the individual for 
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privatized dissent (citizenship evolved in the private realm). Third, in passive 
democratic mediums, citizenship rights are given from above without or 
prior to a struggle from below (passive citizenship or citizen as subject) 
combined with a legitimacy of representative institutions, courts and the 
welfare state system (citizenship evolved in the public realm). Fourth, in 
plebiscitary authoritarian mediums, citizenship rights are once again given 
from above (passive citizenship). Yet, although the state invites the citizens 
to periodically elect a leader, the latter is no longer responsible to the elec-
torate on a daily basis, and therefore, private life emerges as a "sanctuary 
from state regulation" (citizenship evolved in the private realm) (Turner 
1992: 46). 
Turner refers to the French conception of citizenship within the revolu-
tionary tradition, where there existed an attack on the private space of the 
family, and religion. The American conception of citizenship contained 
motifs of the liberal pluralist solution, since participation was emphasized 
yet contained by a continuous emphasis on the privacy and the sanctity of 
individual opinion. The English case under the seventeenth-century settle-
ment, in Turner's opinion, was an example of the passive democratic 
solution, since citizens appeared as mere subjects combined with a legiti-
macy of the representative institutions. German fascism constitutes a 
degeneration of plebiscitary democracy where "the individual citizen is 
submerged in the sacrcdness of the state which permits minimal participa-
tion in terms of election of leaders, while family life is given priority in the 
arena of personal ethical development" (Turner 1992: 55-6). The failure of a 
radical bourgeois revolution in Germany in the 1840s and the realization of 
unification from above in 1870 by means of Bisrrfarckian legislation, paved 
the way to passive citizenship which became the main carrier of social rights. 
The absence of a successful liberal revolution produced an underdeveloped 
public realm in Germany (Turner 1993: 10). 
The Turkish conception of modern citizenship, when viewed from the 
angle of Turner's classification, seems akin both to the French 
Revolutionary tradition, since there exists an attack on the private space of 
the family and religion, and the German passive tradition. In Turner's (1992: 
56) formulation, the former tradition may collapse into totalitarianism when 
the "state in pushing egalitarianism to the extreme closes off the private 
sphere from influencing the course of political affairs." The Turkish concep-
tion differs from the French one, since it was defined from above and 
therefore is passive. It is similar to the German conception because the 
absence of a successful liberal revolution and hence participation produced 
an underdeveloped public realm. Turkish citizenship is defined from above 
(passive) within an exaggerated public space which smothers the individual 
and invades the private space of the family and religion. Üstel (1996b; 2002) 
observes an effort to supervise and regulate the private realm in citizenship 
education, such as the listing of appropriate fun and recreational activities, 
the regulation of health and hygiene, as well as dress codes, until the end of 
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the 1940s. She, for instance, highlights the. sections, in books on citizenship 
education dealing with "appropriate" forms of entertainment and physical 
education that are suggested by virtue of being "hygienic and moral" (Üstel, 
2002: 281). As Minister of the Interior Şükrü Kaya argued (cited in Soyank 
2000; 113-14) in reference to the enactment of a law on the necessity of 
physical education in 1938: 
Every regime seeks an appropriate type of citizen and finds it. We know 
the citizen of the absolutist regime. The man of the regime of Atatiirk, 
the Kemalist revolution, is well shaped, clever, brave, dignified, merry 
and serious, and defends his rights and ideas in every circumstance. We 
are looking for this. The aim of this physical education is intellectual, 
moral, and ethical training. This is the type our regime entails. ... Being 
well behaved, polite, dignified and serious are Turks' most obvious 
features in confrontation with the world. ... We would like to see our 
citizens dignified, in their public life as well as in their private life. 
(Soyarık 2000: 113-14) 
Perhaps what distinguishes the Turkish notion of citizenship from the 
French tradition is the absence of an Enlightenment prior to the establish-
ment of citizenship. If, following Immanuel Kant (cited in Reiss 1970), 
Enlightenment is defined as "man's emergence from his self-incurred imma-
turity," the Turkish notion of citizenship presumes an unenlightened, 
immature individual. Hence, the notion of Turkish citizenship was 
constructed prior to an enlightened, "free" individual capable of producing 
demands. Such a notion purports to steer the common lives of immature 
beings by means of duties. The citizens are not expected to reason. Rather, 
they are expected to follow, in elaborating on national morals, Mustafa 
Kemal says: 
In a nation which is developed and has reached a perfect level, the 
requirements of national morals are undertaken by the individuals in 
that nation [- without resorting to reason - by means of the voice of their 
conscience and emotional instinct]. 
(Tezcan 1996: 17; my translation) 
Writing in 1929 -30, Mustafa Kemal acknowledged the immature state of 
the Republic and argued that what is usually relegated to individual initia-
tive in developed countries should be considered as vital state undertakings 
in our country. As he put it: 
Our Republic is very young; it is not yet capable of contemporary 
undertakings and all the grand tasks that it has inherited from the past. 
As in political and intellectual life, in economic undertakings too, it 
would not be correct to wait for the results of individual initiatives. The 
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significant and grand tasks should be realized in a successful way only 
by a government that relies on national wealth and organizes the 
dispensing and bearing of national sovereignty by relying on all the 
institutions and power of the state. 
(Tezcan 1996: 54; my translation) 
The concept of modern citizenship evolved in such a way as to exclude a 
liberal individualist dimension in Turkey. Whereas in Western Europe the 
notion of the individual appeared in philosophical writings prior to the 
emergence of modern citizenship, in Turkey, the citizen precedes the indi-
vidual. Hence, Turkish citizens found themselves in a position to be 
absorbed in grand social projects such as Kemalism, Socialism, and political 
Islam. Trapped in the missions of such projects, they were unable to recog-
nize the significance of becoming an individual prior to becoming a 
Kemalist, Socialist, or political Islamist, 
In Turkey, the civil and legal, political and social rights associated with 
citizenship were given from above. They were not acquired as a result of 
struggles from below. The notion of Turkish citizenship evolved within the 
civic-republican tradition by emphasizing practices that were viewed as 
duties. In the early years of the Republic, Turkish citizens were geared 
toward embracing the fundamental tenets of the Turkish revolution, namely 
nationalism, secularism, populism, republicanism, etatism, and revolu-
tionism. The association of such aspects of the Republican ideology with 
citizenship paved the way to its definition by disregarding a distinction 
between the public and the private realm. The republican elite defined not 
only the public duties of the citizens but also their private roles, dress codes, 
and their recreational activities. It is, then, possible to argue that the notion 
of Turkish citizenship was defined from above by the republican elite by 
disregarding the privacy of individuals. In sum, it is possible to argue that in 
the founding years of the Turkish Republic, Turkish citizenship was defined 
from above by a state elite within the civic-republican tradition, by empha-
sizing duties over rights and by disregarding the privacy of the individual. 
In sum, the republican citizen was expected to "follow" rather than reach 
certain decisions via his or her own reflection. She or he was the subject of 
another will. According to Hans Reiss, who interpreted Kant's definitive 
study on the Enlightenment: 
He [Kant] does not consider it to be the purpose of politics to make 
people happy. Happiness is subjective. ... 
This argument, of course, does not mean that he does not wish people 
to be happy. It only means that political arrangements should not be 
organized in such a way as to aim at promoting happiness, but that they 
should permit men to attain happiness in their own way. 
(Reiss 1970: 25; my italics) 
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Accordingly, Turkish citizens were discouraged from pursuing their own 
happiness. Rather, they were integrated into a grand civilizational design 
which was believed to promote happiness. The individual that was defined in 
some liberal texts was quite delimited. She or he was not that different from 
the citizen envisioned by the state elite. Hence, a political culture that 
prompted the will to follow rather than the courage to reason began to 
evolve in the Turkish Republic. Will triumphed over reason. Perhaps the 
most revealing metaphor pertaining to the triumph of will over reason in 
Turkey is the place deemed appropriate for the replica of Auguste Rodin's 
famous sculpture The Thinker, which represents a naked, reflecting man. 
The most distinguished Turkish replica of The Thinker resides in the yard of 
a mental hospital in Istanbul, as if signifying a tribute to the discouragement 
of a naked moment of reflection (read Enlightenment tradition) in Turkey. 
Citizenship and membership 
When the issue of citizenship was being discussed publicly in Turkey in the 
course of the 1990s, the notion of "constitutional citizenship" attracted 
some attention. When the then president, Süleyman Demirel, used it in one 
of his speeches, he referred to an umbrella concept that bestowed on citizen-
ship an identity without regard to ethnic, religious, gender differences. The 
concept was appropriated from the German context, where the difference 
between citizenship as membership of a nation (Volk) and citizenship as 
membership of a state had paved the way to a critical debate. The notion of 
"constitutional patriotism" was initially suggested by Jiirgen Habermas 
(1992). By this notion, Habermas referred to a post-traditional citizenship 
that involved membership of the state. In the midst of the Historikerstre.it 
(historians' debate) in Germany that gained momentum with the move 
toward unification in the late 1980s, Habermas challenged traditional 
versions of identity and argued for state-citizens in place of nation-citizens 
(Kadioglu 1997). Since citizenship entailed membership of a nation (Volk), 
in a Germany on the eve of reunification, Habermas' argument for citizen-
ship as membership of a state was pertinent. Nevertheless, while Habermas 
has emptied the ethnic content of the notion of citizenship, he still views it 
as a "membership" of a post-traditional entity. He is basically arguing that 
the German notion of citizenship should be more like the French one. But 
what about the French notion of citizenship? 
Rogers Brubaker (1992) argues that in France nationhood was under-
stood in political rather than ethnocultural terms. Yet, he also argues that: 
"The politics of citizenship is first and foremost a politics of nationhood." It 
makes references to questions of identity rather than self-interest. Hence, 
although nationhood has secular political references, it still has a cultural 
basis. In evaluating Brubaker's position relating nationhood and identity, 
James Donald (1996: 173) argues that in this view civic identity cannot be 
extricated from national identity. Donald (1996: 174) declares that "the posi- 
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tion of citizen must not have a substance." This is the starting point of 
Donald's attempt to envision citizenship as non-membership and as a posi-
tion. As Donald puts it: 
Any claim to identify citizenship in terms of cultural identity - even, I 
would say, the identity of post-traditional constitutional patriotism -
undermines democratic popular sovereignty and the rights of citizen-
ship by drawing a line separating those who are members of this 
political community from those who are not. My argument is therefore 
that "the citizen" should be understood in the first instance not as a 
type of person (whether German nationalist or constitutional patriot) 
but as a position in the set of formal relations defined by democratic 
sovereignty. Just as "I" denotes a position in a set of linguistic relations, 
an empty position which makes my unique utterances possible but 
which can equally be occupied by anyone, so too "the citizen" denotes 
an empty place. It too can be occupied by anyone occupied in the 
sense of being spoken from, not in the sense of being given a substantial 
identity, 
(Donald 1996: 174) 
This view of citizenship as ''an empty space'' or pure Cartesian cogito, is 
quite significant in envisioning citizenship as non-membership, as detached 
from notions of identity. Hence, while Habermas gives a post-traditional 
content to membership that signifies citizenship, Donald suggests the 
"substancelessness of citizenship" by drawing from Slavoj Zizek (1991). He 
elaborates on the unmasking of the ''person '' from the attire of the 
modern 
masquerade. "Modern" means the creation of an unreadable surface. The 
seclusion of the individual, his or her invisibility, stands in the way of a 
notion of citizenship as an empty space. 
In the Turkish context,the development of the individual was curbed to a 
great extent. In the words of Ahmet Agaoglu (1933: 27) who was one of the 
well-known liberals who fell in opposition to the Republican People's Party 
at the time of the founding of the Turkish Republic: 
In the Orient, the individual was drowned, in the Occident he had liber-
ated himself; on the one side the individual was squeezed, weakened, 
and made into a meager being under an increasingly ferocious despo-
tism, and put into his own narrow and constricted sheath. In the 
Occident, on the other hand, the individual gradually took a hold of his 
freedoms and, by constantly opening up, felt the pleasure of living and 
working as a result of the weakening of despotism. As a result, the 
Oriental societies composed of constricted individuals placed into their 
own sheath also became constricted and weakened. 
(Agaoglu 1933: 27; my translation) 
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Citizenship preceded and had prevalence over the notion of the indi-
vidual in Turkey. The notions of citizenship, will and republic ended up 
taking precedence over the notions of individual, reason and democracy. 
Citizenship was embedded in national identity as well as defined in accor-
dance with duties in a rather weak public space. Hence, it is rather difficult 
to envision citizenship as an empty space, as non-membership. 
Notes  
 
1 Many international and national conferences held in Turkey began to be orga-    ; 
nized around the themes of citizenship, identity, multiulturalism, etc., especially 
in the latter half of the 1990s. There was a pioneering international symposium 
organized by Marmara University's International Relations Center in Istanbul on 
28-9 March 1996 entitled "Redefinition of Nation, State and Citizenship." A 
subsequent national conference was organized by Egc University in Izmir on 10-
12 April 1996 entitled "Republic, Democracy and Identity." The papers were 
collected in a book, Cumhuriyet, Demokrasi ve Kimlik (Republic, Democracy and 
Identity), edited by Nuri Bilgin, 1997. A similar international conference was i 
organized by Mersin University and Deutsch-Türkische Vereingung zum Sozial-und 
Geisteswisscnschaftliche Austausch in Mersin on 28 October-1 November 1997 
entitled "Multiculturalism, Immigration and Globalization." 
2 Hasan  Bülent  Kahraman refers to  the  construction of  all  the  Marshallian 
aspects of citizenship in Turkey "in a dash," rather than its gradual "completion" 
as  a  process  (Kahraman,   1996:  6).  See  also  the papers  and  discussions in 
Türkiye'de İnsan Hakları Semineri (Seminar on Human Rights in Turkey), 1970: 
65. 
3 In this part, I have drawn on a similar classification that I have made in an earlier 
article.   See  Kadioglu  (1998b).  The  present  version  has  been  reinforced  by 
enriching the information regarding the institutional developments in Turkey. 
4 For  a  review  of  such  practices  pertaining  to  Turkification,   such  as  those 
regarding the necessity to speak Turkish (1931), utilization of Turkish family 
names (1934), the law on the settlement of minorities (1934) and the tax on the 
property of Muslims, non-Muslims, foreigners and converts (1942), see Aktar 
(2000); Soyarık (2000); Yıldız (2001). 
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Legal and constitutional 
foundations of Turkish 
citizenship 
Changes and continuities 
Nalan Soyank-Şentürk 
Introduction 
Recent years have witnessed ongoing debates and negotiations between the 
European Union and Turkey concerning legal and constitutional reforms. 
The Copenhagen criteria set forth requirements to be met by candidate 
countries, and arc concerned with the existence and stability of institutions 
guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and 
protection of minorities. Therefore in the process of candidacy for the 
European Union not only are the legal and constitutional features gaining 
more significance, but also they can no longer be regarded as distinct from 
the political sphere. Thus, within a year, major legal and constitutional 
amendments have been carried out, which would in turn affect the main-
stream understanding of citizenship in Turkey. Especially after the 
Copenhagen Summit held in December 2002, these legal and constitutional 
aspects seem to loom larger on the agenda. In the conclusion of the Summit, 
the European Union stated that: 
It strongly welcomes the important steps taken by Turkey towards 
meeting the Copenhagen criteria, in particular through the recent 
legislative packages and the subsequent implementation measures which 
cover a large number of key priorities specified in the Accession 
Partnership. The Union acknowledges the determination of the new 
Turkish government to take further steps on the path of reform and 
urges in particular the government to address swiftly all remaining 
shortcomings in the field of the political criteria, not only with regard to 
legislation but also in particular with regard to implementation.1 
(Copenhagen Summit Conclusion) 
Therefore, the legal and constitutional aspects of Turkish citizenship stand 
out as one of the significant and debated issues both in the domestic politics 
of Turkey and in its relations with the European Union. 
Among the various aspects of citizenship, such as identity, civic virtue 
and legal status, the legal aspect stands out as one. of the core aspects. In 
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other words, citizenship-as-legal-status provides the basis of citizenship. 
This chapter aims at providing the legal and constitutional basis of Turkish 
citizenship throughout republican history. This basis is significant because 
legal and constitutional arrangements stand out as political phenomena 
within the modernity project. The legal side of citizenship is usually interre-
lated with the political history of a country. Tn analyzing the development 
and evolution of Turkish citizenship, the legal developments and the three 
constitutions are reflective of the developments and changes experienced in 
the history of the Turkish Republic. Therefore, the constitutions of 1924, 
1961 and 1982 will be evaluated subsequently, in addition to the citizenship 
laws enacted throughout the history of the republic. However, it can be 
argued that the legal and constitutional developments cannot by and of 
themselves reflect the whole process of citizenization. Even though the 
social and political conditions of the country are usually reflected in the 
constitutions, the actual processes sometimes diverge from the path delin-
eated by the constitution and the related laws. In other words, while a 
constitution stands out as an abstract document, the practices might be 
quite different or deviate from the basic principles of the constitution. Or 
the constitution and those laws cannot be satisfactory for the conditions of 
the society. This is one of the reasons for this study. The elaboration of the 
constitutions in republican history and current developments will highlight 
both the issue of Turkish citizenship and the ongoing debates between the 
European Union and Turkey concerning legal reforms. 
The legal and constitutional foundations are one of the core elements of 
citizenship in any country. As Bendix (1964: 74) argues, 
In the nation-state each citizen stands in a direct relation to the 
sovereign authority of the country in contrast with the medieval polity 
in which, that direct relation is enjoyed only by the great men of the 
realm. Therefore, a core element of nation building is the codification of 
the rights and duties of all adults who are classified as citizens. 
(Bendix 1964:74) 
Those foundations sometimes go in parallel with the process of nation-
building and construction of citizenship identity, or diverge from this 
process in certain aspects. 
One of the major tasks of the new Turkish Republic that was promul-
gated in 1923 was to determine who would be defined as a Turkish citizen in 
terms of the Constitution and the laws. The following section will analyze 
the Constitution of 1924, the Citizenship Law of 1928, and the Law on 
Settlement enacted in 1934, which is still in use for the admission to citizen-
ship. Then the 1961 Constitution and the Citizenship Law of 1964 will be 
elaborated. The last constitution of Turkey, namely the 1982 Constitution 
will be the concern of the final section. 
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The 1924 constitution 
When the Turkish Republic was proclaimed on 29 October 1923, the first 
and major task was the formation of a nation-state. Regarding the Ottoman 
dynasty and the regulation of the state as the real cause for collapse, the new 
republic aimed at a complete renewal. Therefore, the republic went through 
widespread reforms in every aspect of life. The Gregorian calendar and 
twenty-four hour clock were adopted. On 4 October 1926 the Swiss Code 
was adopted as the Turkish Civil Law. The previously used Arabic alphabet 
was changed to the Latin alphabet on 3 November 1928, and public usage of 
the Arabic alphabet was prohibited (Lewis 1961: 278). This was a real break 
from the Ottoman heritage, and it was also designed for the formation of the 
Turkish nation. These reforms were the main steps taken for the creation of 
a nation that was composed of "civilized" citizens who were educated in 
modern methods, and whose modernity was reflected in their appearance. It 
was believed that the survival of the new republic was dependent on the 
adoption of nationalism and secularism, and the construction of a Turkish 
citizenship that would be parallel to both nationalism and secularism. 
The 1924 Constitution was in fact preceded by a constitution devised 
after the Turkish Grand National Assembly was formed in 1920. Even 
though the concern is the republican period, for the purpose of this chapter, 
the way the 1921 Constitution defined the "Turkish people" is also signifi-
cant. Accordingly, the "Turkish people" were "the masses who were living 
within the boundaries of the armistice, regardless of their ethnic origin, that 
got together on the basis of political unity and independence" (Tanor 1988: 
250). In other words, the "Turkish people" was defined on the basis of polit-
ical and geographical parameters (ibid.: 249). However, this was the period 
of struggle for independence, and the definition had to be inclusive. Even 
though the formation of the Parliament was a fundamental break from the 
Sultanate, at that time the intentions for the proclamation of the republic 
were not explicit; therefore this constitution had to appeal to all the people 
living within the boundaries of the National Oath. We can assume that the 
people were still considered as the citizens of the Ottoman Empire, subject 
to the Ottoman Citizenship Law of 1868, as there were no clear statements 
about the citizenship status of the people in the Constitution of 1921. 
When we return to the 1924 Constitution, Article 88 of the Constitution 
stated that "the people of Turkey regardless of their religion and race are 
Turkish in terms of citizenship" (Gozubuyiik 1995: 76). Yıldız (1998: 302-3) 
points to the novelty in the law about mentioning Turkishncss,2 and stresses 
the debates over who will be defined as a Turk. After long debates, as Tanor 
(1988: 309) notes, the Constitution stressed that Turkishness was defined in 
terms of geographical and political parameters rather than racial parame-
ters, despite the existence of racial and religious differences. During the 
same period Mustafa Kemal stated that "The people of Turkey who promul-
gated the Turkish Republic are called the Turkish Nation." In other words 
"the core of nationality is not race, but political loyalty" (Turan 1969: 73). I 
Legal and constitutional foundations    127 
also suggest that in that early phase of the period in question, there was an 
inclination toward the French or the Western type of citizenship based on 
territory. Besides, the usage of "Turk" can also be seen as the reflection of 
the aspiration for the formation of a new nation. 
The 1924 Constitution seemed to be a liberal constitution with regard to 
individual rights. The basic rights and freedoms were listed in the fifth 
section, Türklerin Hukuku Ammesi (The Public Rights of the Turks). Those 
were, briefly, security of life, liberty, honor, and property; freedom of 
conscience; freedom of press and communication; and freedom to form 
associations (Gözübüyük 1995: 71 6). It is noted by both Gözübüyük and 
Tanor that the 1924 Constitution was inspired by the French Revolution. 
Tanor argues that the constitution had a liberal and individualistic 
approach; and that the limits of the liberties were not drawn by the benefits 
of the state, public or the society, as had been the case in the following 
constitutions. However, Gözübüyük (1995: 54), on the other hand, argues 
that the constitution merely listed basic rights and liberties with short defini-
tions, but that there was not a regulation that safeguarded those rights and 
liberties, and that the regulation and boundaries of those rights was left to 
the executive. In line with Goziibiiyuk's point, it can be argued that the 
Public Rights of the Turks section of the Constitution looks like a mere 
delineation of rights and liberties, which was not guaranteed by any body or 
institution. On the other hand, when the citizenization process in the early 
republican period is analyzed, it is seen that there was no emphasis on the 
rights of the citizen. Rather, the process repeatedly emphasized the duties of 
the citizen toward the state, therefore it was civic republican. For instance, 
tnan, whose Medeni Bilgiler (1988) can be viewed as the manifesto for 
Turkish citizenship, stated that citizens could only gain rights through 
completing their duties toward the state. The 1924 Constitution is an 
example of the differences and contradictions between the discourse of the 
legal documents and actual practices. The early Republican understanding 
of citizenship can be regarded as civic republican. The emphasis on duties 
toward the state and the community as part of the identity of the citizen, 
and the notions of common good and general will were reflected in the 
discourse of the period. It is also argued that those notions were reflected in 
the 1924 Constitution (Tanor 1988). However, the 1924 Constitution in and 
of itself is not sufficient for understanding the conceptualization of citizen-
ship in the period concerned; therefore certain laws like the Citizenship Law 
and the Law on Settlement should also be utilized in order to reach a more 
comprehensive legal understanding of Turkish citizenship. 
The 1928 Turkish Citizenship Law 
As mentioned above, citizenship had been a crucial element in the nation 
building process and the republic. However, the first citizenship law of the 
Turkish Republic had not greatly occupied the agenda of the Parliament. The 
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1312 numbered and 23 May 1928 dated Turkish Citizenship Law was decided 
to be enacted by 1 January 1929 {TBMM Zabit Ceridesi, 23.5.1928 ). No 
debates or questions were raised at the parliamentary meeting concerning 
this law. All the articles were read and voted upon without any objections. 
The law adopted both descent and territory principles. According to 
Article 1, "children born from a Turkish father or mother, either in Turkey 
or in a foreign country, are considered as Turkish citizens." Also, according 
to article 2/c, determination of the child's citizenship was not based on the 
official marriage of the parents. Those articles reflect the principle of jus 
sanguinis by granting citizenship to the children of the Turkish citizens, even 
if they were abroad, or born out of wedlock. Articles 2/a, 2/b and 3, clari-
fying the circumstances for the admission of the children of foreigners or 
stateless people settled in Turkey, were designed for the exercise of the jus 
soli principle. Nomer (1989: 45) argues that those articles were designed in a 
complementary manner. 
The first Citizenship Law of the republic provided merely a definition of 
the Turkish citizen. It was probably enacted as part of the nation building 
process, and it is evident from the parliamentary records that it was not 
regarded as a crucial issue by its legal definition. The legal status of Turkish 
citizenship can be regarded as the abstract definition of citizenship. But, the 
actual practices in a sense deviate from that abstract definition. The nation 
was defined as a political and social group with a unity of language, culture, 
and ideals. This was an inclusive definition in the first instance. However, the 
degree of inclusion varied by the religious or ethnic differences in actual 
practice. 
According to the Lausanne Treaty, signed on 24 July 1923, the non-
Muslim population of Turkey, namely Greeks, Armenians, and Jews, were 
granted minority status. The articles of the treaty relating to minority status 
are numbered between 37 and 45. Those articles granted minorities the free-
doms of worship, travel and migration, the right to speak their own 
languages, and form their own religious, educational and social service asso-
ciations (Lcvi 1996: 19). According to Article 42, the minorities had the 
right to regulate their own traditions and customs and their own laws in 
family and personal matters (Aktar 1996). 
However, the republic intended to grasp all of its population under one 
law, namely the Civil Law. During the preparation of this law in 1925, the 
minorities gave up their rights granted by Article 42, either willingly or 
unwillingly (Aktar 1996; Levi 1996: 68-9; Bali 1999: 90-102). But this did 
not better their situation, or help them to be accepted as full citizens of the 
Turkish Republic. 
The Law on Settlement 
The 2510 numbered Law on Settlement is significant for the issue of citizen-
ship, as it is still used for admitting people to Turkish citizenship. Besides, as 
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will be elaborated below, this law points to the transformation in the under-
standing of citizenship from a territorial notion toward a more common 
culture and descent-oriented one. 
The 2510 numbered Law on Settlement was enacted on 14 June 1934. 
According to the Minister of Interior Affairs, Şukrüi Kaya, thanks to this 
law, the country "would be transformed into a country where a single 
language is spoken, and the same thoughts and sentiments are shared by the 
people" (TBMM Zabit Ceridesi, 14.6.1934: 141). In the introductory speech, 
the Kutahya deputy, Naşit Hakkı Bey, noted that this law was one of the 
fundamental laws of the revolution (TBMM Zabit Ceridesi, 7.6.1934: 67). In 
his long speech, he mentioned the importance of unity in language, culture 
and ideals, and added that this law would help the assimilation of those who 
regard themselves as non-Turkish, or who had lost Turkish identity. By 
taking measures for people to speak Turkish, and abolishing tribal organiza-
tions, those who were from other cultures or who spoke other languages 
would be absorbed, and assimilated, into the Turkish culture {ibid.: 70). 
The first article of the Law on Settlement stated that the dispersion and the 
settlement of the population would be regulated according to the degree of 
adherence to Turkish culture. Thus, the Turkish territory was divided into 
three regions: the first region was the territory where the population with 
Turkish culture desired to concentrate. The second region was the territory 
spared for the settlement of those who were to be assimilated into Turkish 
culture. The third region would be evacuated for health, political, military and 
security purposes; settlement in that region would be prohibited (Article 2). 
Article 3 stated that those people of Turkish descent, or those close to 
Turkish culture who migrated with the desire of settling in Turkey, would be 
accepted by the decision of the Ministry of Interior and be called muhacir 
(emigre). Those emigres and refugees would resettle in the places shown and 
would not be permitted to leave those places (Article 7). Besides, the emigres 
would be helped in their resettlement, and naturalization would be made 
easier for them (Article 6). On the other hand, those who did not adhere to 
Turkish culture, anarchists, spies, nomadic gypsies, and those who were 
deported, would not be admitted as emigres (Article 4). 
The nomadic gypsies of Turkish nationality would be dispersed to 
villages of Turkish culture; foreign nomadic gypsies and nomads who did 
not adhere to Turkish culture would be deported (Article 9). In addition, 
Article 10 abolished leadership of the nomadic tribes (aşiret reisliği). Those 
two articles were designed especially for the dispersion of the Kurdish tribes. 
More specifically, Bali (1999: 256) noted that the law was designed in order 
to disperse the Kurds after their rebellions. 
Article 11 is significant for the situation of the non-Turkish minorities. 
The spread and assimilation of those people were safeguarded by this 
article. It stated that those people whose mother tongue was other than 
Turkish would not be permitted to form separate wards or associations. Also 
the number of foreigners permitted to settle in towns and villages was 
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limited to 10 percent. The Law on Settlement aimed at mass resettlement 
and dispersion of the population, and those resettled people could not move 
to other places even after ten years of settlement (Article 29). 
The Law on Settlement was a major development in the process of 
Turkification. For the sake of assimilating non-Turkish elements, major 
rights of freedom of movement were violated. Besides, pressure on people to 
speak Turkish intensified. The non-Turkish population was spread over the 
country so as to be absorbed by the Turkish culture. The Law on Settlement 
was a perfect reflection of the motto of the republic: "one language, one 
culture, one ideal." 
The legal definition of citizenship in the early republican period was egal-
itarian, and sought to benefit from both jus sanguinis and jus soli. In the first 
instance, Turkish citizenship was close to the French model that was based 
on territory with the premise that "those who are affiliated lo the Turkish 
State by citizenship are known as Turks." However, later a shift can be 
depicted in the attitude toward minorities, the emphasis on adoption of 
Turkish culture, and the admittance of those people who were regarded as 
close to Turkish culture as emigres and to citizenship. This shift reflects the 
German type of citizenship based on descent and unity of culture. 
The 1961 Constitution and its aftermath 
This section will dwell upon the period after the military intervention of 
May 1960 and the Constitution devised afterward. This period is significant, 
because it can be regarded as the period when there was a liberal atmosphere 
to a considerable extent. A shift in the understanding of citizenship was 
experienced during this period. The citizen of the period was active and 
there was a primacy of rights as compared with the duty-laden citizenship of 
the early republican period. 
As the Democrat Party (DP) was reaching ten years in office, social 
unrest, especially among university students and the military, was 
increasing. The military had already lost its dominant status in state 
affairs. Together with the bureaucracy they had been regarded as the key 
actors of the state during the early republican period. In fact, the tension 
between the political elites and the state elites had always been, and would 
continue to be prevalent in Turkish politics. Combined with the DP's 
movement toward an authoritarian regime, and the sympathy felt to the 
Republican People's Party and its leader İsmet İnönü, who had served in 
the War of National Independence, the unrest of the military increased. To 
make matters worse, the DP tried to use the military against demonstra-
tions opposing its rule. Thus the first military intervention in republican 
history took place (Tachau and Hcper 1983; Harris 1988). The military 
claimed that, "they were safeguarding democracy and the state, and the 
legacy of Ataturk," which would also be a justification for future interven-
tions (Karpat 1988: 141). 
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The 1961 Constitution that was devised after the military takeover is 
significant for the transformation of the society and the understanding of 
citizenship. The Constitution was written in a rather detailed format, in order 
to eliminate the misuse of power. During preparation of the Constitution, 
the Commission for the Constitution benefited from the two drafts prepared 
by the Faculty of Law of Istanbul University and the Faculty of Political 
Science of Ankara University. Also, the French, Italian, and German consti-
tutions were utilized, in addition to Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
The European Human Rights Agreement and the French Declaration of 
Human and Citizenship Rights (Tanor 1988: 74). The Constitution was 
promulgated after a referendum held on 9 July 1961. 
The new Constitution was based on the supremacy of the rule of law. It 
was stated repeatedly that every issue would be carried out in accordance 
with the law, and in certain cases in accordance with international law. The 
Constitution had a preface where the main characteristics of the Turkish 
nation were defined, stating that: 
The Turkish nation ... inspired by Turkish nationalism that gathers all 
the individuals sharing the joy and grief as an indivisible whole around 
the national consciousness and ideals, and that aims at raising our 
nation with a spirit of national unity as an honorable and equal member 
of the world family ... in order to consolidate a democratic rule of law 
with all its legal and social basis, that would safeguard the realization of 
human rights and freedoms, national solidarity, social justice, welfare of 
the individual and the society. ... approves and proclaims this 
Constitution prepared by the Constitutive Assembly of the Turkish 
Republic, and entrusts this Constitution to the guardianship of its sons 
devoted to freedom, justice, and virtue. 
(Kili and Goziibuyuk 1985: 171-2) 
It was evident from its preface that this Constitution relied on universal 
norms like human rights, social justice, and welfare, and that the individual 
was given more importance and an active role, especially with the mention 
of the right to resist. 
Whereas the 1924 Constitution defined the Turkish Republic in Article 2 
in accordance with the Kemalist principles defined by the "six arrows" as 
"the Turkish Republic is republican, nationalist, populist, etatist, secular, 
and revolutionary," the 1961 Constitution declared in its definition that "the 
Turkish Republic is a national, democratic, secular and social rule of law, 
that relies on human rights and principles" (Gözübüyük 1995: 56, 115). This 
article and the Constitution as a whole reflects the desire for the introduc-
tion and implementation of universal standards and human rights, and for a 
social state that seeks the welfare of its citizens. 
When we dwell upon the novelties introduced by the 1961 Constitution 
with respect to citizenship, we see that this detailed Constitution placed. 
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importance on individual rights and liberties and aspired to a more active 
citizenship. Article 54 of the 1961 Constitution {ibid.: 131) defined the 
Turkish citizen by stating "everyone who is tied to the Turkish State through 
citizenship ties is a Turk" and continued: 
The child of a Turkish father or a Turkish mother is a Turk. The citizen-
ship status of child born from a foreign father and a Turkish mother 
will be arranged by law. Citizenship is acquired and lost under the 
circumstances defined by law. No Turk can be expelled from citizenship, 
unless he/she engages in activities contrary to their loyalty to the 
country. The decisions and implementations of expulsion can be subject 
to appeal.3 
(Article 54, 1961 Constitution) 
The 1961 Constitution differed from the previous constitution in many 
respects. First, the 1961 Constitution was designed in a more inclusive, 
humanitarian and universal manner. In contrast to the 1924 Constitution 
that used "Turk" as its operative term, the 1961 Constitution used 
"everyone," and included foreigners as well, but designed their status and 
the limitations of their freedoms in accordance with international law 
(Article 13). 
The Constitution limited the interference of the state into the affairs of 
the individual and defined the duties of the state toward the individual, 
which was a significant departure from the primacy of the obligations of the 
citizen toward the state in the early republican period. In this respect, this 
Constitution was a liberal constitution and aspired to a more liberal kind of 
citizenship. 
The exposition of basic rights and liberties took up almost two thirds of 
the Constitution, and was very detailed. In Article 10 it was stated that 
everyone had inviolable basic rights and liberties. Article 11 safeguarded 
these liberties thus: 
The basic rights and liberties can only be limited through law that is in 
accordance with the spirit and statement of the Constitution. However, 
this law cannot restrain the core of the rights or liberties even for 
reasons of morality, public order, social justice or national security. 
(Article 11, 1961 Constitution) 
The basic rights and liberties of the individual were mainly the immunity 
of private life (Article 15) and residence (Article 16), the freedoms of 
communication (Article 17), travel and settlement (Article 18), faith and 
conscience (Article 19), thought (Article 20), education (Article 21), and 
right to property (Article 36), Under this section the freedom of the press 
was expressed. The rights and freedoms of meetings and demonstrations, 
and  to form associations without seeking permission, were  safeguarded 
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(Articles 28 and 29). The only limitations on these rights would be drawn by 
law for the protection of public order. 
The emphasis on the social welfare state is evident in the section on 
"Social and Economic Rights and Duties." Here, the right to work (Article 
42), to rest (Article 44), to a just wage (Article 45), to form trade unions 
(Article 46), to go on strike (Article 47), to social security (Article 48) and to 
medical treatment (Article 49) were listed. Those articles reflect an evolution 
toward the social phase of citizenship in Marshall's (1965) analysis. 
However, the social rights were again granted from above, as had been the 
case for both civil and political rights. The atmosphere of the social welfare 
state would be curbed later, after the 1980 military coup and with the 1982 
Constitution, which limited most of the rights and liberties granted by the 
1961 Constitution with the reason that the 1961 Constitution was too liberal 
for Turkish society.4 Therefore, the period between 1961 and 1980 can be 
viewed as the transitory social welfare state with an active and liberal under-
standing of citizenship. 
Those articles mentioned above also reflect the importance given to social 
justice. In addition, equal educational opportunities for every citizen, male 
or.female, and sufficient nutrition were safeguarded by the Constitution. 
Tanor (1988: 392) states that this social aspect was a novelty of the 1961 
Constitution, the elements of which were "the object of social justice, social 
rights granted to the individuals and groups, the social duties bestowed 
upon the state, the developmental plans and the establishment of the State 
Planning Organization." 
The 1961 Constitution points to the divergence from a republican under-
standing of citizenship that focused on the duties of the citizen toward the 
state, which was implemented during the early republican period. By this 
Constitution, the individual was given a higher value and the reconciliation 
of the individual's and the society's rights and liberties was the major target 
(Tanor 1988: 378). By an extension of the rights and liberties of the citizen 
and a limitation on the state's interference, a more liberal and active under-
standing of citizenship was introduced. During this period, a new 
citizenship law that is still in use today was also amended. 
The 1964 Turkish Citizenship Law 
The 403 numbered Turkish Citizenship Law was put into effect on 11 
February 1964.5 The reason for the new law was to reform Turkish citizen-
ship law in line with conventional citizenship law. The new Citizenship Law 
was another step on the move toward the rule of law. The aim was to base 
the law on universal principles of citizenship and citizenship rights. Tn line 
with this principle of the rule of law, the right to appeal was included in the 
403 numbered and 11 February 1964 dated Turkish Citizenship Law. The 
proposal was based on three universal principles of citizenship law. The first 
was the principle that everyone should have citizenship and the situation of 
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statelessness should be eliminated. The second was the principle that 
everyone should have only one citizenship. And third, everyone should be 
free to choose his or her own citizenship and no one should be forced to 
hold a citizenship he or she does not want. 
The other feature of the 403 numbered Turkish Citizenship Law was to 
distinguish between expulsion from citizenship and loss of citizenship. The 
former 1312 numbered Citizenship Law did not distinguish between those 
two, and all citizens had been subject to expulsion under this law. Under the 
403 numbered law, those people who ascribed to Turkish citizenship would 
not be subject to expulsion, with the exception stated in Article 26. However, 
those who acquired Turkish citizenship could be subject to expulsion under 
the circumstances stated in the same article. Those persons who acquired 
Turkish citizenship and were expelled from citizenship due to the article 
mentioned above could not by any means be re-admitted to Turkish citizen-
ship (Turkish Citizenship Law Proposal: 3). 
Loss of citizenship was designed to deal with activities that are not in line 
with loyalty to the state. Therefore, those persons who were living abroad 
and had not applied to the Turkish embassy in the last five years,6 or those 
persons who published criticisms of the Turkish government abroad, would 
lose their Turkish citizenship (Turkish Citizenship Law Proposal: 3). In 
addition, loss of citizenship was defined by Article 25.7 
The 403 numbered and 11 February 1964 dated Turkish Citizenship Law 
explicitly stated that the principle of jus sanguinis was exercised in Turkey. It 
might be suggested that this principle was exercised to an almost extreme 
level, by barring Turkish women married to a foreigner from citizenship on 
the grounds that the father's citizens-hip was the determinant. This would, 
however, be changed in 1981, perhaps due to changing international 
dynamics and attempts to eliminate discrimination against women.8 
The 1982 Constitution 
In 1980 Turkey experienced another military intervention. There was 
extreme ideological polarization and turmoil within the country. The 
reasons given by the military for the takeover were the safeguarding of the 
integrity of the country, preventing civil war and re-establishing the 
authority of the state (Tachau and Heper 1983: 26). In 1982 a new constitu-
tion was devised. As mentioned previously, the rights and liberties of the 
1961 Constitution were curbed to a great extent, and we can depict a return 
to the civic republican understanding of citizenship. 
In the 1982 Constitution, the fourth section is related to political rights 
and obligations. Article 66 of this section states that: 
Everyone who is annexed to the Turkish State with citizenship ties is a 
Turk. The child of a Turkish father or a mother is a Turk. Citizenship is 
acquired and lost for the reasons clarified by law.  No Turk can be 
Legal and constitutional foundations    135 
expelled from citizenship unless behaving in a manner disloyal to the 
country. The judicial process cannot be closed to the decisions and 
proceedings of expulsion from citizenship. 
(Article 66, 1982 Constitution) 
But before the enactment of the Constitution, citizenship had been the 
issue on the state level. The debates around citizenship started in February 
1981, right after the military coup. At that time the National Security 
Council was in charge of state affairs, and it made an amendment in the 
Turkish Citizenship Law together with the Consultative Assembly. Even 
though the Turkish Citizenship Law was enacted in 1964, there were consid-
erable changes and annexations made during this interregnum period, 
therefore most of the data used in this section is limited to this period of 
1981-3. The changes were to three significant aspects. First was the improve-
ment concerning dual or multiple citizenship. With the amendment on 13 
February 1981, 
withdrawal from Turkish citizenship is subject to permission of the 
Council of Ministers when ... citizenship of a foreign country has been 
acquired in any manner or when there is convincing evidence that 
someone is going to acquire a foreign country's citizenship. 
(Turkish Citizenship Law) 
This amendment was particularly significant for Turkish people who had 
gone to, for instance, Germany as guest workers but who had eventually 
settled there. Previously, holding dual or multipfe citizenship had not been 
permitted; however, because of the problems arising from the situation of 
Turkish emigrants settled in other countries, this new law was designed as a 
solution (Abadan-Unat and Kemiksiz 1986; içduygu 1996a; 1996b; içduygu 
et al. 1999). According to this law, people wanting to acquire citizenship of 
another country would first apply to the authorities and obtain the permis-
sion documents for withdrawal from Turkish citizenship. However, after 
they acquire another country's citizenship, there is still an opportunity to 
retain Turkish citizenship by returning the required documents to the 
Turkish authorities within three years of obtaining the permission docu-
ments. According to içduygu et al. (1999), Turkey decided to permit dual 
citizenship for its citizens living abroad because of the practical national 
interests of "the wish to keep close contacts with its citizens abroad, and 
therefore encouraging emigrants to retain their citizenship and transfer it to 
their children." Even though the implementation of dual citizenship is a 
challenge to the general definition of citizenship which holds that "citizen-
ship should be unique" (Brubaker 1989), Turkey took an adoptive attitude 
in this dual citizenship debate. Although Turkish emigrants had some uncer-
tainties about dual citizenship (icduygu 1996a; 1996b) they responded 
quickly to the new developments. Starting from the amendment of the law, 
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until the transition to multi-party politics in November 1983, a total of 
1,171 people applied for permission to renounce their Turkish citizenship.9 
Another significant development was related to the circumstances the 
country went through after the military coup. The military leaders of the 
period viewed the ideological polarization in the country as the real cause of 
the situation, especially as represented by the left. Therefore many leftist 
intellectuals and people were arrested and imprisoned. Some fled the 
country; however, a new law was put into effect which would leave them 
without Turkish citizenship. The meeting on these changes to the citizenship 
law was held in camera and thus the debates were not made public. 
According to the law numbered 2383 and dated 13 February 1981 (Resmi 
Gazete, 21.3.1981, no. 17,286), which was annexed to Article 25 of the 
Turkish Citizenship Law dated 11 February 1964 and numbered 403, 
a person who has been engaged in activities violating the internal and 
external security of the Turkish Republic or the economic and financial 
security of the country in the form of an offense described by the law or 
a person who, after being engaged in such activities at home, has in any 
manner gone abroad such that it is not possible to file a public action 
against him or to initiate penal proceedings or to enforce a ruling and 
who has failed to return despite notification within three months, or in 
the case of a Martial Law or Emergency Situation within one month, 
shall lose his citizenship. 
(Turkish Citizenship Law) 
In line with this law, people who had fled the country for fear of being 
arrested because of ideological affiliations or offenses, lost their Turkish citi 
zenship (Resmi Gazete, 1981 3). This law and its enactment are significant 
in the sense that many people were left without citizenship for the first time, 
and this would lead to problems after the transition to civilian rule. Another 
significant aspect related to this law is that it determined "who would 
deserve membership of the state and who would not"; besides, the law was 
used as a kind of punishment for those who did not act in accordance with 
the principles of the regime. — 
Starting from 1981 there is a large-scale loss of citizenship on the part of 
the non-Muslim elements of the republic for the reasons expressed in Article 
25 of the Citizenship Law, paragraphs (a),10 (c), (d) and (e). The amendment 
of these paragraphs indicates the increasing concern for those who have left 
the country and have not returned. However, the two articles of the 
Citizenship Law Article 20 for withdrawal permission and Article 25(a) -
seem contradictory. While one states that "a person who has acquired the 
citizenship of a foreign country in any manner can have withdrawal permis-
sion," Article 25(a) refers to, as mentioned above, "those who have acquired 
foreign citizenship without obtaining permission." As the former does not 
mention any form of permission before the acquisition of foreign citizen- 
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ship, it becomes problematic to decide who would lose his/her Turkish citi-
zenship and who would get withdrawal permission. Rather it seems to be a 
kind of method used to eliminate those non-Muslim citizens who were living 
abroad, even though this argument may seem rather tough.11 On the other 
hand, there was the naturalization of large numbers of people of "Turkic 
origins" in a significant manner. When decisions of the Council of Ministers 
are issued in Resmi Gazete (Official Gazette) it is quite easy to find pages of 
lists of people of Bulgarian, Yugoslav or Afghan nationality who have been 
admitted to Turkish citizenship. The legal reason for this admission is found 
in the Law on Settlement mentioned above. By analyzing those two develop-
ments we can draw some significant conclusions. Even though it seems to be 
merely a legal process, while forcing non-Muslim citizens to give up their 
citizenship, admitting others to citizenship reflects more than that. It resem-
bles the process of Turkification of the population in the early republican 
period, especially when the increasing emphasis on the Turkish-Islamic 
synthesis in the 1980s is taken into consideration. 
During the period of 1981-3 many people were admitted or re-admitted 
to Turkish citizenship in line with the laws mentioned above. During this 
three-year period there was an ongoing process of both withdrawing citizen-
ship from some people and admitting others to citizenship. Compared to the 
previous periods there is an increasing concern with the issue. It seems as if 
by taking hold of the state, the military regarded itself as responsible for 
issues related to citizenship and started to put forward new solutions to 
these problems. However, the changes made during this period led to other 
problems after the transition to civilian rule. 
Issues of citizenship did not appear on the agenda of the Parliament 
again until 1989. Starting from January 1989, some aspects and articles of 
the Citizenship Law began to be debated in the Parliament. For instance, it 
was proposed to annul Article 25(g). Even though the proposal was rejected, 
it paved the way for discussions on the practices of the military regime on 
citizenship. During this period we witness an increasing concern with citi-
zenship, which was viewed as a basic human right from which no one should 
be expelled arbitrarily. Also, those implementations were seen as an obstacle 
to Turkey's relations with the EC, and the military regime was criticized for 
its implementations on citizenship (Speech of Ali Haydar Erdogan, TBMM 
Tutanak Dergisi, 20.4.1989: 309-12). It was a period when Turkey's citizen-
ship issues were starting to be discussed with reference to the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, international law, and Europe. 
The annulment of Article 25 paragraph (g) came eleven years later, on 27 
May 1992. The proposal was discussed in Parliament on 13 February 1992. 
In the proposal it was stated that a total of 227 people had lost their citizen-
ship in accordance with paragraph (g). The reason behind this proposal was 
declared as in order to make this law and practices of human rights in 
Turkey compatible with universal traditions, international treaties, Turkey's 
political regime and with the society's aspirations for integration with the 
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modern world (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 17.2.1992). Thus, the annulment of 
paragraph (g) of Article 25 was accepted and the documents and records of 
the people concerned were updated; furthermore, all their property, which 
had been confiscated by the government, was returned. 
During the 1990s, Parliament was concerned mostly with the dual citizen-
ship problem and legal procedures. On many occasions questions were 
raised about the process of withdrawal from citizenship and the problems 
and shortcomings of the system. In order to solve this problem and find a 
solution to the status of those living in other countries, withdrawal from 
Turkish citizenship was made easier. The requirement of completing mili-
tary service before withdrawal was annulled (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 
7.6.1995, pp. 98-101). Besides, Article 29 of the Citizenship Law stating that 
a person who has lost Turkish citizenship will be treated as a foreigner, was 
changed by adding a statement that they may have the rights of a Turkish 
citizen in matters such as residence, acquiring and transferring real estate, 
inheritance and labor (ibid.). 
The underlying goal of this change was to encourage dual citizenship 
among Turkish migrants living in other countries. This encouragement 
however, was based on the promotion of the interests of Turkey in those 
countries by placing those people in key positions in, for example, political 
life. When the proposal was being debated in the Parliament, all party repre-
sentatives emphasized the importance of the Turkish people's votes, if they 
were to be naturalized in the countries concerned, for the formation of 
coalition governments. In other words, those people were regarded as the 
representatives of Turkish interests in the countries where they lived. It was 
not an attempt to solve the problems of those people's status in their 
country of residence and help them enjoy equal rights with the natives of 
those countries. 
Hammar (1989: 81) notes that debate over dual citizenship involves the 
question of the meaning of citizenship. In the dual citizenship debates in 
Turkey, citizenship in this sense was limited to a legal definition, that of 
acquiring legal membership of the host country. However, the social and 
cultural aspect was perceived to be reserved for Turkish citizenship. In other 
words, it was believed that those people who acquired another country's citi-
zenship would still serve the interests of Turkey in the host country. 
Starting from the early 1980s, citizenship became a significant issue in 
Parliament. At first it was used as a kind of control mechanism and as a 
form of punishment for those who were "against the regime." After the tran-
sition to the democratic multi-party system, it was again an issue, but this 
time to meet the requirements of democracy. As had always been the case, 
parliamentary and legal concerns on citizenship were limited to the 
European or Western point of view. The legal codes and implementations 
were criticized and annulled because they were seen as obstacles to the 
modernization and development of Turkey. The changes regarding dual citi-
zenship, as mentioned above, were made with secondary concern for Turkish 
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people seeking the benefits of Turkey in the countries where they lived and 
had become citizens. As is clear from the changes made, dual citizenship was 
encouraged. It was stated that citizenship laws stem from the internal and 
special needs and features of each individual country. However, the internal 
problems of citizenship were not even debated in Parliament. But as identity 
problems increased, and new problems related to Turkish citizenship as 
defined by the state emerged, new discussions and debates came onto the 
agenda. 
Conclusion 
When we examine the history of the Turkish Republic, we witness certain 
shifts in the conception of citizenship. During the formation of the Republic 
the legal conceptualization was more in line with the French version. 
However, starting from the 1930s it became closer to the German version. 
On the other hand, there was and is a close affiliation to the civic republican 
understanding, which emphasizes the primacy of the state and the duties of 
the citizen. The citizenization process in the early republican period had the 
major objective of constructing a citizen who was devoted to the sustenance 
of the Kemalist revolution. This was carried out not only through legalistic 
developments, but in almost all aspects of life as well (Soyank 2000). The 
1961 Constitution represents a transitory period when the emphasis shifted 
toward the rights of the citizen and a more liberal understanding. However, 
after 1980 there was a revival of the early republican conception, one which 
the state still tries to adhere to. When increasing identity claims and social 
unrest are taken into consideration, we can argue that there is a deep need in 
Turkey for a change in the Constitution, which was one of the major 
requirements for candidacy to the EU. The recent constitutional amend-
ments of 2001 and 2002, regarding basic rights and liberties, the abolition of 
capital punishment, the extension of opportunities for broadcasting in 
mother tongues, and the new package of reforms of the new government of 
the Justice and Development Party for the extension of freedoms and adop-
tion of the standards of the European Union, hold out some hopes for a 
more rights-oriented and liberal understanding of citizenship. However, in 
my view, there is still a need for a new constitution. This new constitution 
should be devised not from above, but by taking the people's desires, opin-
ions and needs into account. In order to accomplish this, "an interplay 
between institutionalized processes of opinion and will formation and the 
informal networks of public communication should occur" (Habermas 1994: 
351). Then we might see the possibility of democratic state-society relations 
in Turkey, which would be based on a new constitution, recognizing the 
importance of the language of the rights of individuals as citizen-subjects. 
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Notes 
1 http://www.eu2002.dk/news/upload/ conclusions_DER_CPH2002121323534.doc 
The concern over implementation of the legal reforms is expressed also in the 
EU's    2003    Regular    Report    on    Turkey's    progress    towards    accession. 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report_2003/index/htm 
2 Here Yıldız (1998) quotes the statement of reasons for Article 88 as: 
Since the Ottoman Empire had been obliterated and perished, the members 
of the nation could no longer be called "Ottoman." National self-honor 
cannot accept belonging to a dynasty. Our state is a national state, not an 
international or supra-national one. The state can recognize no nation other 
than the Turk. Tt is not proper to consider racial differences as an obstacle to 
nationality since there are peoples of different origins in the country who 
possess equal rights. Likewise, since freedom of conscience is certified, reli-
gion also has not been considered as a hindrance to nationality. The Turkish 
nation too, like all the new nationalities, could embody people of different 
races. But it is the community of the Turks (Türklük camiası) that has the 
capability of bringing together all the races. (see TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, 2nd 
period, meeting 2, 7: 216, 9.3.1340 (1924)) 
3 This article is different from Article 88 of the 1924 Constitution that stated that 
everyone who is admitted to citizenship through the Citizenship Law is consid 
ered as a Turk. The 1312 numbered Citizenship Law stated that every child born 
of a Turkish father or a Turkish mother would acquire Turkish citizenship. The 
1961  Constitution granted citizenship status only to those children born of 
Turkish fathers,  and leaves the status of children born  of Turkish mothers 
ambiguous by stating that their status would be arranged by law. The citizenship 
law will be analyzed below. 
4 In fact, the limitation on the rights mentioned in the Constitution of  1961 
started with the 1971 coup by memorandum and many of the related articles 
were re-amended. 
5 The Law Proposal was dated 28 May 1962. See TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 20/1: 
477-97,  507-11,  29.8.1963.  Also  see   TBMM  Tutanak  Dergisi,  26/1:   504-8, 
11.2.1964. 
6 This provision  was laid down in Article  11  of the  1312 numbered Turkish 
Citizenship Law. 
7 The Council of Ministers may rule that the following persons have lost their 
Turkish citizenship: 
 
(a) those who have acquired foreign citizenship without obtaining permission, 
(b) those who were in any service of a foreign country not in line with the 
interests of Turkey and were notified in the name of the government by 
embassies or consulates abroad or by local administrative officials at home 
to give up such services but declined to do so voluntarily during the given 
period which may not be less than three months, 
(c) those who continue lo work without the permission of the government in 
any service of a country which is at war with Turkey, 
 
(c) those persons abroad who are called by the competent authorities to do 
their military service or, in time of war, to join home defense but have not 
done so within three months without excuse, 
(d) those who abscond to foreign countries while being forwarded for military 
service or after joining their units and do not return within the legally 
prescribed period, 
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(e) those members of the armed forces or military incumbents who are abroad 
on duly, on leave, for changing climate or for medical treatment and fail to 
return home within three months without excuse after the expiry of their 
terms, 
(f) those persons who after acquiring Turkish citizenship by the competent 
authority, live outside Turkey for at least seven years without a break and 
do not undertake any formal contacts and transactions to indicate that they 
have not cut off their interest in and ties with Turkey and that they have 
maintained their Turkish citizenship. 
But the formerly excercised requirement for them to leave Turkey and clarify 
their properties was annulled, and they were given the possibility of re-admit-
tance to Turkish citizenship. But before or during the re-admittance process, they 
would be considered as foreigners. 
8 However, Nomer (1988: 46-7)) argued that those articles were not discriminatory 
or contrary to the provisions of the International Convention on the Elimination 
of All Kinds of Discrimination of Women, which was enacted on 3 September 
1981 and signed by Turkey in 1985. (Here it should be noted that this is a later 
development, and during the 1960s the international debates on the status of 
women were not very strong). Nomer stated that the articles concerned granted a 
more "privileged" status to women than men, rather than discriminating or 
subordinating them. Nevertheless, it seems a bit naive to suggest that an article 
that excludes children born of Turkish mothers and foreign fathers from Turkish 
citizenship,  or in  a way  urges  the Turkish woman concerned to admit her 
husband's citizenship is a privilege. 
9 Those resolutions can be found in Resmi Gazete (Official Gazette) of 1981-3. 
 
10 This paragraph is amended per law no. 2383/6 on 13 February 1981, like para 
graph (g) of Article 25 of the Citizenship Law. However, as mentioned in the 
text, the original draft of the law cannot be scrutinized as the meeting was held 
in camera. The Turkish Citizenship Law and the Official Gazette are used in this 
text as references. 
11 It is not possible to list all the names here, but they are available in the relevant 
issues of Resmi Gazete (OfTicial Gazette). 
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